prove its performance in such operations?

J. Bowyer Bell provides a good analysis of what he calls the Dragonworld; that is, the internal structures and dynamics of terrorist and guerrilla movements. Bell's credentials as an analyst of these Dragonworlds are excellent. He has personally interviewed hundreds of revolutionary fighters in many past and ongoing violent conflicts.

Bell insightfully discusses why the US military has had such a difficult time responding to Dragonwars. Specifically, he postulates that revolutionary conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, South Africa and Vietnam are almost incomprehensible to a US society used to settling political conflicts through compromise, consensus



and negotiation. As an institution that quintessentially reflects US society's ideals, values and beliefs, the US military is similarly uncertain and confused about how to conduct Dragonwars.

Because Dragonwars are not going to go away, the US military must improve its ability to respond to them. Bell does not recommend more funding, weapons or personnel; he shrewdly realizes that in MOOTW less is often more. He urges military leaders to give special operations forces more support and consideration. Such a recommendation is well worth heeding in the aftermath of the stunningly successful US victory in the Persian Gulf War. The US military, being all too willing to refight the last successful war, could otherwise be oblivious to new national security threats.

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MR Letters

Battle Command Training Needs Strategy

Colonel Ronald Bertha's thought-provoking article, "Battle Command: Replicating the CTC Experience" (*Military Review,* November-December 2000), suggests that replicating combat training exercises (CTC) during home-station training is important and necessary. However, it is insufficient to solve the problem. Bertha's suggestion introduces the larger issue associated with battle command training—the absence of a comprehensive Army training strategy to address leader and leader-team preparation.

Effective battle command training at home station should align with an overall strategy that addresses how individual, team, staff and commander tasks are learned and mutually reinforced at the schoolhouse, in the unit and through self-study. Those designing a training program for battle command must assess the total requirement and only then address the home-station piece within that larger context.

The home-station program should identify, train and sustain battle command tasks that apply throughout a career. Army policy and Bertha seem to isolate battle command tasks to the battalion level. Regardless of where training occurs, battalion-level battle command must relate vertically to actions at brigade and company levels—if not two levels above and below—and horizontally within the organization between the commander and the staff/staff groups and with adjacent battalion commanders.

Commanders cannot structure effective training without first understanding which tools best teach the specific tasks to be trained. Requisite understanding includes a precisely defined training context to account for varying complexity among tactical missions. Until basic skills are mastered, attempting advanced skills wastes time. That is why the Army categorizes training into crawl, walk and run levels.

Home-station training must develop leaders as individuals and as members of competent, cohesive leader-teams. The leader training aspect of a CTC experience focuses on general staff preparation before arrival, but battle command training occurs essentially at the CTC rotation itself, and improvement often comes more during post-CTC reflection than during CTC performance. Leaders must learn by doing at the CTC because few practical battle command training alternatives are available to the unit commander. No comprehensive training strategy identifies leader or leader-team battle command tasks or the tools needed for training them during home-station train-up or sustainment.

The good news is that superb, repetitive learning experiences at a midintensity battle rhythm clearly improve battle command performance at the CTC. The bad news is that it is an isolated, too-infrequent opportunity. Without a leader and leader-team strategy for battle command

training, mandated five-day home-station battalion field training exercises will not likely provide the repetitive learning experiences necessary for battle command and staff performance at a walk level of proficiency, let alone at a run level. Long-term success will result only when these skills can be practiced in an organized, structured manner competently coached and reinforced outside the CTCs.

But, with no comprehensive leader and leader-team training strategy, doctrine prescribes no battle command exercises at home-station comparable to the situational training exercise and drills at company echelon and below. For example, the most important team on the battlefield includes the brigade commander, battalion commander, company commander and platoon leader. No training doctrine (including Field Manuals (FM) 25-100, *Training the Force,* and 25-101, *Battle Focused Training,* and brigade or battalion mission training plans) recommends a strategy specifically for training this commander team. Of more concern, there is no list of tasks, conditions and standards for acceptable performance. Such shortcomings can be corrected in future version of these manuals.

In the 1990s, the Army Research Institute and the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, began researching the Force XXI Training Program, including provisions for battle command. Researchers sought to define critical combat functions that more clearly identified essential vertical and horizontal battle command and staff activities. Efforts were only partially successful. There was no agreement to explain how command and staff actions interrelated vertically and horizontally before devising training methodologies and identifying appropriate training tools. The concept was never incorporated as a requirement in either training doctrine or in major command-directed training programs. However, the excellent efforts to define the need for a comprehensive strategy remain valuable for future projects.

The absence of structured learning programs in the art and science of tactical command contributes to prevailing misuse of virtual and constructive simulation. No conceptual approach relates the use of simulation to progression through the crawl-walk-run levels for crews or small units—much less for leader-teams in battle command. Therefore, no relevant guidance specifies which simulation or combination of simulations—live, virtual or constructive—is appropriate for which battle command tasks conducted at what point in the training process.

The Army's original conceptual design envisaged that virtual or constructive simulations could train most basic crawl skills needed to prepare for full-up walk exercises on the ground using live simulation (the multiple integrated laser engagement system) then expose leaders and soldiers to complex battlefield conditions at the run level. Simulations can also expose leaders and soldiers to battlefield conditions that are too dangerous (night melee fighting), too costly (fighting multiple attack helicopters) or ecologically proscribed (firing depleted-uranium ammunition) to conduct any other way. Run-level training for such tasks was not subsequently defined by task, condition or standard, so no training requirement was developed and confirmed.

Although simulation requirements for crawl- and some run-level tasks are now better defined, Army emphasis on improving walk-level training has focused virtual simulation there. Virtual simulation was never intended to replace vital walk training on the ground, but since no comprehensive training strategy addresses how all battlefield tasks should be trained and sustained, commanders develop their own solutions. Thus, valuable simulations do not serve design purposes, which is a much broader issue than preparing for battle command.

Having inadequate tasks, conditions and standards for crawl-walk-run training is a serious deficiency for crews and small units, and there is no requirements-determination process to fix the problem. The inadequacy is grave for leaders and leader-teams preparing for battle command using either virtual or constructive simulation. There are no explicit leader-team training requirements to guide use of costly simulation infrastructure, so it is no surprise that home-station use of simulation for battle command preparation is so spotty.

While we applaud Bertha's application of CTC practices to home-station training, such efforts alone will not solve the battle command training challenge. Effective training requires defined leader and leader-team tasks, conditions and standards. Integrating these tasks under a comprehensive, intense, rigorous training approach that harnesses simulations will best prepare leaders for the demands of combat command.

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Lost Opportunities

I would like to make several comments about Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. DePue's *Military Review* article, "Lost Opportunities: The Revision of AR 220-1" (November-December 2000). Regarding training readiness, DePue states that the assumption "is that the unit would not be deployable until it is fully trained." While this is a desirable goal, it is not a valid assumption. Army units can and often do deploy in less than a fully trained status. For example, all Army units that deployed to the Persian Gulf War were not training-level-1 (T-1).

DePue says that training and the mission-essential task list (T-METL), "in whatever form it ultimately takes, moves the Army toward objectivity, although most agree it is still too subjective."

Notes from the June 2000 Re-write Conference indicate that many conferees recognized and commented on the subjective elements of T-METL. However, the training work group, which included the overwhelming majority of participants, supported the T-METL implementation as a metric for determining the unit-status

report (USR) training level.

Also in his discussion of squad and crew manning, DePue cites Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, *Unit Status Report*, as being "a bit vague on whether hand grenades, Claymore mines or the AT-4 should be considered" in the equation of what is applicable training for a combat arms crew or squad or for an infantry squad.

AR 220-1 is a status-reporting policy document—not a training doctrine publication. Standards for individual training are prescribed in doctrinal training publications. AR 220-1 must be used with applicable training publications to translate unit training accomplishments into a training level for USR purposes.

DePue states also that the Department of the Army's (DA's) "interpretation of squad availability for operational missions might seem uncomfortably lenient to some." AR 220-1's policy guidance regarding squad/crew availability is provided to standardize the determination of personnel availability—not to minimize the negative impact of deployments to unit status. Considering unit personnel who are already deployed in the area of responsibility (AOR) as "available" is logical and reasonable. Neither war planners nor war fighters indicate significant discomfort with these longstanding DA guidelines. Also noteworthy is that personnel availability issues that DePue addresses have not been presented as contentious issues among US Army National Guard (ARNG) comments on the current AR 220-1 draft.

DePue states that "pressure on [noncommissioned officers] NCOs and junior officers who prepare readiness reports might be subtle and implicit, but it is real. To help their unit and their boss look better, many will inevitably inflate their unit's squad/crew qualification numbers."

Unit commanders are responsible for training their units and, according to Army training doctrine, are the primary trainers. Commanders at higher levels have responsibility to provide training guidance, support and oversight. Soldiers who prepare status reports are not responsible for conducting or evaluating training. DePue's assessment ignores this point, suggesting that ARNG commanders are totally uninvolved and uninformed regarding unit training and are totally dependent on subordinates for accurate assessments.

When speaking of full-time manning in Reserve Components (RC), DePue says that implementing Training-Fully Mission Qualified (T-FMQ) and Training-Combat Capable (T-CBT CAP) "could have some nasty unintended consequences. For example, each type of squad/crew has its own measure of qualification. Therefore, these metrics will require some pretty careful and time-consuming record keeping."

In 1998, AR 220-1, change 3, established requirements for units to report selected squad/crew manning/qualification data in the USR. T-FMQ and T-CBT CAP do not require units to collect or report additional information, and the squad/crew qualification status reported is based on doctrinal requirements. Maintaining records reflecting the qualification status of squads and crews is a necessary training-management requirement unrelated to USR metrics.

In the discussion of battle rostering, DePue states, "Commanders will be forced to play the numbers drill to maintain their T-rating." Battle rostering is a doctrinally accepted training-management practice that is sometimes necessary to achieve uniformity when measuring or portraying the training status of squads and crews. The AR 220-1 draft proposes that commanders should use battle rosters to portray their unit's training status more accurately. Battle rostering is not mandatory at DA level.

As to availability, DePue contends that "DA assumes the theater commander will ship this company home to rejoin the rest of the battalion in the event a crisis occurs that would require the entire battalion to mobilize. . . . If a serious international crisis occurs that requires that divisional infantry battalion, what theater commander in chief (CINC) would be willing to ship 150 infantrymen out of theater?"

Redeploying units from a smaller scale contingency to a major theater of war is not an assumption but an element of our national military strategy. Major Army commands consider these contingencies when they develop and provide instructions to SSC deploying units for disengagement. Accordingly, personnel availability is determined and reported in the USR according to MACOM guidance. The author's speculation about what CINCs would be willing to do is not supported by precedent, strategy or logic.

DePue contends that some people "in DA state that AR 220-1 needs to go no farther in defining T-METL because the regulation explicitly ties the commander's assessment to training-management doctrine in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*. Ideally, referring to training doctrine in the draft regulation should be enough. In practice, it would break down almost as quickly as the current means of determining training readiness does—when commanders must determine the number of training days for units to become fully proficient."

DePue discounts or ignores differences in existing doctrinal support for the current metric (training days) and the proposed T-METL metric. FMs 25-100 and 25-101 provide extensive policy guidance and procedures for determining METL and for assessing the status of METL training. However, there is little Army-level policy or procedure to guide the commander in determining unit training days, making this an almost entirely subjective determination based on a unit commander's judgment and experience.

DePue feels that "DA is convinced commanders must be allowed some subjectivity." While some at DA might share this opinion, this is not an official position.

DePue quotes from AR 220-1, paragraph 7-5d, that if "the new T-level metrics implemented by this regulation result in a T-level degradation greater than one T-level increment from the T-level reported before implementation. . . , then use applicable command channels to immediately inform the MACOM. . . . Implementation of the new T-level

metrics is not intended to cause widespread instant non-readiness."

While DePue and others might believe such verbiage sends the wrong message, others understand senior Army leaders' legitimate desire to avoid surprises by understanding how policy changes will affect units. We need to do this until we can develop predictive readiness performance measures.

DePue continues the discussion about verbiage and DA's second guideline for revising Army training metrics: "This guidance reflected the concern of senior Army leaders over dramatic changes to unit status that could be either misunderstood or politicized. Dramatic changes might be interpreted by some to suggest that the previous status reports submitted by Army commanders were inaccurate, misleading or untruthful." To DePue, this "gets to the heart of the problem. The Army was offended when Congress suggested the Army has been less then truthful in reporting unit readiness. The Army's defensiveness has spawned such language, which seems to be more concerned with spin control than accuracy."

DePue's interpretation and understanding of "such language" is off-track. Credibility with Congress is important to the Army. Dramatic, unexplained and unanticipated changes to unit-status levels could damage that credibility. DePue's comments about the Army becoming defensive and focused on spin control are unsupported speculations based on his misreading of an unsigned memorandum.

In DePue's view, "The regulation should help commanders make the right call—to be honest to themselves and the rest of the Army. . . ." He then asks, "But can we expect commanders to be truthful while the regulation is peppered with language that encourages the manipulation of data?"

AR 220-1 is a status-reporting policy regulation and nothing more. It can and should promote status-reporting accuracy, but it cannot solve the integrity problems DePue addresses. There is no better source of unit-training status information than the commander on the ground who is responsible for the training.

Because no two units are the same, Army USR policies must provide appropriate flexibility so:

- The commander can evaluate his unit in a manner that makes sense.
- It is uniform for like-type units.
- It is understandable at higher levels.
- It is supported by applicable doctrine.

There is no substitute for moral courage, integrity and common sense. It is a prerequisite for command.

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